How do economic crisis a §ect national-level policy choices? Are technocratic advisors more likely to enter government during periods of severe economic volatility? If so, how does such governance a §ect economic policymaking and social responsiveness? In this paper, I evaluate the role of technocratic advisors on Latin American reforms. Building on the political psychology literature, I argue that collective crisis memories in technocratic communities have a disproportionate ináuence on elite-level policymaking. Employing an originally constructed data index, the Index of Economic Advisors, I conduct a large-N cross-national test from 1960-2011 to examine whether economic crises lead to more technocrats serving in presidential cabinets, and Önd that crises often professionalize presidential teams. The statistical results also show that technocratsí governance approaches are conditioned by the nature of past shocks. An ináationary crisis history makes budget austerity more likely. Deáationary spirals have been far less common in Latin America, but comparative case study evidence of Argentina in the early 2000s shows that these shocks often catalyze sustained Öscal expansion. This investigation has signiÖcant implications for the study of democracy and development. Technocratic governance might help provide economic stability following crises, but an enduring political focus on past crises can limit policy áexibility and social responsiveness.
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Introduction
Throughout her Örst term in o¢ce, Brazilian President Dilma Rousse § has often rea¢rmed her governmentís commitment to budgetary discipline during periods of political uncertainty. In her response to last summerís mass demonstrations, Öscal responsibility and ináation control were a central component to her Öve pillars of government reform. In the prelude to this yearís presidential elections, Rousse § declared to Congress that price stability is "non-negotiable" and further underscored her "profound commitment to Öscal responsibility." Her predecessor, Luiz In·cio Lula da Silva, would also often champion good Öscal governance in public speeches, for example highlighting that "controlled ináation represents an extraordinary gain for salaried workers." 1 Why would incumbent presidents from a developing country like Brazil that has struggled with poverty, income inequality, and unemployment repeatedly emphasize budget discipline over stimulus? Why not oversee large budget deÖcits that distribute political beneÖts to as many people as possible?
To explain such phenomena, I develop a theory rooted in a countryís technocratic understanding of its past economic crises. I argue that high economic volatility creates risk aversion among politicians. In contrast to standard risk preference models that weight all historical information equally, I claim that a legacy of economic crises has a disproportionate ináuence on elite-level decisionmaking. The powerful and painful collective memories of economic trauma causes politicians to appoint ministers who have specialized training in economics that promises to improve governance and avoid repeating past crises.
These technocrats are often empowered politically because of their non-partisan expertise, but they are not immune from ideational leanings economically. Macroeconomics is a profession that has been dominated by two major schools of thought, Keynesianism and Monetarism. Both governance approaches have crisis roots, but they o §er competing policy prescriptions. Keynesian hopes to catalyze economic recovery through government stimulus, while Monetarism hopes to control excessive expansion through austerity.
I anticipate that the type of past economic shock ñ ináation vs. deáation ñ will ináuence how these economic teams approach macroeconomic governance in their respective countries. 1 nancial crises likely reáects di §erences in their understanding of their crisis past. President Obamaís áurry of economic stimulus that followed the 2008 Önancial calamity was anchored by a powerful, anti-depression discourse. Fearing that a severe credit crunch would unleash a deáationary spiral not seen since the Great Depression, Obama used massive spending to avoid an economic collapse.
Itís not surprising, however, that U.S. politicians place a higher weight on escaping a known economic catastrophe, the Great Depression, than a trauma they have never experienced like very high or hyperináation. 2 By contrast, Germanyís strident advocacy for economic orthodoxy during the eurozone crisis reáects the countryís deep-seated ináation fears. Even years after the Weimer Republicís extraordinary trillion-fold ináation, many German politicians expound on the merits of ináation control.
In the wake of Europeís crisis, for instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed that "protecting people from ináation: thatís what really matters." 3 Crisis aversion begins in the political realm, but is perpetuated through technocratic communities whose governance approach reáects a countryís crisis history. In nations that have experienced severe ináationary shocks, technocrats ñ who prefer not to risk overheating the economy ñ place disproportionate weight on budget discipline and ináation control. By comparison, in countries that have incurred traumatic deáationary shocks, technocrats ñ who hope to avoid a severe depression ñ are more likely to place disproportionate weight on budgetary stimulus notwithstanding its ináationary risks.
I examine these theoretical claims in Latin America, a region that is ideally suited for this analysis because of its signiÖcant variation in ináation crisis history ñ about one-half of the countries in the region have experienced a high or hyperináation crisis. 4 Using cross-national data from seventeen Latin American countries from 1961-2011, I test whether these ináation crises lead to more technocrats serving in presidential cabinets, and if so, whether technocrats tend to be more Öscally conservative as expected. To analyze the technocratic composition of economic teams, I
employ an originally constructed data index, the Index of Economic Advisors 5 that characterizes the education credentials (i.e. whether or not they have an advanced degree in economics, business 2 The highest ináation rate recorded in the United States during the twentieth century was 14 percent in 1980, well below the astronomical ináation rates in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s (World Development Indicators).
3 La Stampa, July 11, 2007. 4 They include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay. 5 For more details regarding its construction, please see the appendix.
2 or Önance) and the previous employment (i.e. whether or not they are a non-political appointee from the business, Önance, or academic universes) of Önance ministers and central bank presidents throughout Latin America during the last half century.
I Önd that severe ináation crises tend to professionalize presidential economic teams and improve governmentís budget balances. While deáationary shocks have been far more rare than ináationary shocks in Latin America, I present comparative case study evidence showing that these crises tend to yield the exact opposite e §ect: a Öscal expansion.
These Öndings mark a notable departure from the developed country literature on macroeconomic partisanship, providing evidence in support of the developing country scholarship that suggest that party systems are often less ideological than their European and U.S. counterparts. 6 In contrast to traditional models of the economy that expect a partisan split on ináation-control policies that favor businesses, 7 these Öndings show that the powerful and painful collective memories of economic shocks can blur traditional class and partisan ideological di §erences. 8 In the case of ináationary shocks, for example, there is often a political convergence on ináation tolerance where leftist leaders also seek to earn credibility by anchoring ináation. In the wake of income shocks that devastated peopleís living standards, ináation control is not simply the concern of right-wing politicians hoping to please businesses and Önanciers. Left-leaning politicians also realize the importance of ensuring a stable economic environment. 9 For example, former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has emphasized the importance of ináation control for his multi-party political coalition following his countryís hyperináation. 10 "The poor would not tolerate ináation any longer, and the wealthy were tired of seeing their business plans and investments destroyed by rising prices."
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The arguments in this article also engage the important issue of the rise and fall of neoliberalism in developing countries. Within Latin America, scholars have identiÖed a broad emergence of an elite neoliberal consensus in the 1990s, 12 which later crumbled with destabilizing Önancial 6 Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Lupu 2014 . 7 Hibbs 1977 Alesina 1987; Bartels 2008. 8 Other forms of political manipulation, such as using government resources to support incumbent campaign activities, may be more common in these developing countries (Beaulieu and Hyde 2008) . 9 The left favors a stable economic environment given its importance in attracting foreign investment that boosts wages and jobs (Pinto 2013 Mosley 2000 Mosley , 2003 Rudra 2002 Rudra , 2008 Wibbels 2006. 16 Notwithstanding such broad retrenchment, Latin American scholars have found that those countries with importsubstitution industrialization legacies were more likely to craft political bargains (Frieden 1991; Frieden, Pastor, and Tomz 2000) that preserved supply-side interventions such as industrial promotion and public employment (Kurtz and Brooks 2008) , along with a greater emphasis on social insurance (Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011 The article unfolds as follows. The next section contains the main theoretical contribution;
here I explain how economic volatility creates risk aversion among policymakers. In Section 3, I
provide quantitative empirical support for this theory using data from Latin America, a region known for its history of ináation crises. In Section 4, I also assess the policy ramiÖcations of crises that are instead rooted in deáation ñ a far less common occurrence in the region. Given the lack of deáationary observations, a comparative case study analysis is best suited to testing this portion of the theoretical mechanism. I thus employ a country case analysis of Argentina during the 2000s ñ home to the only pronounced case of deáation in Latin America during the last half-century.
Finally, I close by discussing the studyís broader scholarly and political implications.
Theoretical Framework: Economic Crises and Risk Aversion
Informed by the psychology literature 31 on choices under risk and uncertainty, we know that decisions often reáect both descriptive and experiential information. 32 Both types of information help improve Bayesian reasoning; however, experiential information has a disproportionate ináuence on peopleís choices. In other words, people place greater weight on personal judgements than second-hand information from newspapers, books, or the internet. For example, drivers familiar with a town are likely to ignore the electronic bellows of their GPS computer.
27 Carter and Irons 1991; Babb 2001; Montecinos and Marko § 2010. 28 For example, Vreeland (2003) demonstrates that political leaders and economic reformers often use IMF conditionality as a tool to achieve their own domestic agenda priorities.
29 Nooruddin and Simmons 2006. 30 This work builds on previous scholarship that has combined economic structure and human agency to explain the evolution of economic policy decisions (Woods 1995 and McNamara 1998) . 31 I follow in the tradition of Weyland (2002) , who was one of the Örst scholars to employ psychological explanations of economic policy choices in developing countries. While Weyland embeds his path-breaking analysis in prospect theory, I employ an analysis that is rooted in the second generational psychological literature on choices under risk and uncertainty. I show how the powerful and painful collective memories of economic shocks can have a sustaining e §ect on economic policy choices, notwithstanding a countryís position in its economic cycle. 32 Weber et. al., 1993; Weber et. al. 2004; Hertwig et. al. 2004. Ironically, when people rely on their own experiences, they tend to often miscalculate the variance of the true population. Facing this ináation-unemployment trade-o §, politicians must weigh the relative importance of these two factors to the economy. Most macroeconomic models, for example, assume that economic choices reáect politiciansí sensitivity to ináation and unemployment (see the appendix).
A government favoring a Keynesian view is likely to tolerate some ináation in exchange for higher growth and lower unemployment. By contrast, a government favoring a monetarist approach to policy making also cares about growth and jobs, but does not sanction a government-induced expansion, deeming that it only yields higher ináation. 41 The Phillips curve is named after the British economist A.W. Phillips, who in 1958 observed a negative relationship between ináation and unemployment rates. 42 Samuelson and Nordhaus 1995. 43 Friedman 1970. 
Empirical Hypotheses
To evaluate the theoretical priors about ináation crises, I employ the following testable hypotheses:
H1: Past ináation crises breeds economic risk-aversion; a history of ináation crisis yields a greater number of professionally-trained economic ministers than countries that have not experienced an ináation crisis.
H2: Professionally-trained ministers from ináation crisis countries are more likely to improve government budget balances (by either increasing Öscal surpluses or narrowing Öscal deÖcits) 44 Lohmann 1998. 45 Tietmeyer 2001.
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relative to their counterparts from non-crisis countries.
To test these hypotheses, we journey to Latin America, a region that is ideally suited for our analysis because it o §ers signiÖcant variation in ináation crisis history ñ with eight of the seventeen Latin American countries in this study having experienced high or hyperináation. 46 For many of these crisis countries, the gravest bout of runaway ináation occurred during the 1980s. Several of these nations incurred thousand-fold annual price increases, which catapulted the regionís average annual ináation above 500 percent by the end of the decade, compared to single digit ináation elsewhere in the world (see Figure 1 .1).
These ináation crises created acute economic and political costs that still casts a shadow over economic policymaking today. Compared to other types of Önancial and economic crisis, these crises are often the most regressive because ináation hurts the poor relatively more than the rich.
Wealthy individuals are generally sophisticated investors that funnel their earnings into Önancial assets that hedge against ináation. By contrast, the poor typically keep the majority of their earnings in cash holdings that are eroded by ináation. In addition, the poor are often more reliant 46 Hyperináation popularly refers to monthly price increases exceeding 20 percent, though it has been more strictly classiÖed as monthly ináation over 50 percent (Cagan 1956 ). Compounded annually, this yields an ináation rate of almost 13,000 percent! on state spending, including income transfers and pensions, that are not indexed to ináation.
Many empirical studies Önd support for ináationís distributive consequences, showing that high ináation is associated with lower real (ináation-adjusted) wages and higher income inequality in Latin America. 47 For example, during their respective hyperináation crises, real wages declined by thirty, sixty, and ninety percent respectively in Argentina, Peru, and Nicaragua.
In a region like Latin American where the median voter is poor, political leaders are keenly aware of these severe distributive costs. In his reáections about the Brazilian presidency, Fernando Henrique Cardoso claims that "ináation acted like a regressive tax that made poor people poorer." 48 Alejandro Foxley, former Chilean Önance minister and economic architect of Chileís democratic transition, has emphasized a similar point in public speeches, saying "in countries with high ináation, the workers lose all of the time." 49 In fact, most Latin American politicians are highly sensitive to ináation given its historically steep political price. Hyperináation not only ruptured the economic system, but also led to a near breakdown in the political and social order -where protests, rioting, looting, and deaths became commonplace. 50 It also dealt a devastating blow to popular living standards, which helped catalyze unprecedented levels of political turnover. 51 Ináation crises contributed to the ouster of many politicians from o¢ce, including Argentinaís Ra˙l AlfonsÌn, Brazilís Fernando Collor de Mello, Boliviaís Siles Zuazo, Peruís Alan Garcia, and Chileís Salvador Allende ñ which ended in a complete democratic breakdown.
The collective trauma associated with these crises has left a permanent imprint on the national psyche. Not surprisingly, ináation was politically salient at the time. For example, national polls that were conducted during Argentina and Brazilís hyperináations found that more than twothirds of their respective national citizens considered ináation the most important problem facing their families. 52 But, ináation control has also had a steady baseline of support since the end of hyperináation. In its survey of sixteen Latin American countries, the LatinobarÛmetro found that more than one-quarter of the Latin American adult population believed Öghting ináation 47 Cardoso and Helwege 1992; Rezende 1998 . 48 In light of this steady support for ináation control, presidential economic teams have been consistently populated with technocrats that promise to deliver price stability. Guided by historical memories of ináation crises, the disciplined economic prescriptions that Önally ended the 1980ís hyperináations continue to be the bedrock of macroeconomic governance in ináation-scarred countries.
Post-crisis presidents have sought out professionally-trained economists that value ináation-control for their cabinets, distancing themselves from the pre-crisis potpourri of lawyers, public accountants, and even linotypists and linguistics specialists. In the eight countries with crisis-legacies, three-quarters of post-crisis presidential cabinets ñ as measured by the two primary economic cabinet posts, Önance minister and central bank president ñ were professionally-trained economists (Figure 1 .3). 53 Baker 2008. By contrast, in the years before ináation crises, the political and technocratic merits of ináation control were more questionable. In fact, presidential cabinets tended to be far less populated with professional economists concerned about ináation. Less than one-third of economic teams in these ináation crisis countries had graduate degrees in economics or business.
In countries that have never experienced a severe ináation crisis like Venezuela, the historic and current composition of cabinets is quite similar. Only 38 percent of Venezuelan economic ministers and central bank presidents have been professionally trained in economics or business during the last half century. The Venezuelan public tends not to value price stability in the same way as its ináation-scarred neighbors. While ináation saliency is on the rise in Venezuela, national surveys tend to Önd that personal safety and crime are the nationís most pressing concerns. Notwithstanding living with the highest national ináation in Latin America, a 2010 survey found that only 3 percent of respondents named reducing prices/controlling ináation as a national priority. 54
Recall that I expect these di §erences in presidential cabinetsí technocratic composition to in part explain cross-national variation in budgetary discipline. In the rest of this section, I will test this theoretical prior. SpeciÖcally, in what follows I operationalize hypotheses (H1 and H2) with the following baseline regression equations:
54 Consultores 21 (May-June 2010).
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where technocrats it = index of economic advisors (measures the technocratic credentials of economic ministers; see coding rules in the appendix); and where -it =ináation crisis history. The index i = country and t = year. X it = vector of control variables; f t"1it = Öscal dependent variable (one year lag). The term n i = dummy for each country, intended to capture unobserved country e §ects; while " it = error term.
To test these hypotheses, I focus on the coe¢cient on the variable -it (ináation crisis history)
in the Örst regression, and the coe¢cients of the interaction of the variables T echnocrats it and -it in the second regression. A positive coe¢cient when technocrats is the dependent variable, would provide support for the Örst hypothesis that ináation crisis legacies breed ministry professionalization. Similarly, a positive coe¢cient when the governmentís Öscal balance is the dependent variable would conÖrm the second hypothesis that these ináation-scarred technocrats govern with greater budgetary discipline relative to their non-crisis counterparts.
Data and Methodology
This section evaluates the hypothesis in Latin America, using a panel of data covering 16 democratic countries from 1961-2011. Employing the dataset, we can observe how Latin America ñ a region known for its ináation crisis history ñ has governed over the last several decades. The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, in order test for the e §ect of ináationary crises on the professional credentials of economic ministers, I employ an ordered probit regression analysis.
Using the same cross-sectional data set, I then use multivariate regression analysis to examine the e §ect of technocratic economic ministers and an ináation crisis history on government budget balances. I present these Öndings using both Öxed e §ects and a generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimators. All models are estimated with robust standard errors, clustered by country and year. The appendix contains data sources and descriptive statistics.
Technocratic Economic Ministers
In order to test whether crises lead to more technocrats serving in presidential cabinets, I
created an ordinal variable, technocrats it , that measures the professional training of economic ministers. I also use this measure as an independent variable to examine whether a higher share of technocrats in key cabinet posts improves government budget balances. Based on data from the newly constructed Index of Economic Advisors, 55 I code professional educational training of central bank presidents and Önance ministers along a spectrum from 0 to 2 according to the following rule. 56
2 if both advisors have an advanced graduate degree in economics or Önance 1 if one of the the advisors has an advanced degree in economics or Önance 0 otherwise
Ináation Crisis Legacy
Seeking to account for the ináuence of ináationary history on policymaking, I design a binary with the expectation that an unemployment shock will beget greater government stimulus. Finally, based on the assumption that past Öscal performance ináuences present Öscal conditions, I also include a lagged dependent variable in each speciÖcation.
Political Control Variables
How do political institutions a §ect the professional composition of advisers and their policy choices? Are presidents more likely, for instance, to appoint technocrats to their economics teams when their country is under an IMF agreement? Similarly, are technocratic advisors more apt to 59 This phenomenon is known as the Olivera-Tanzi e §ect (see Samuelson and Nordhaus 1995) . 60 These shocks are calibrated using Latin American historical data and are set equal to two standard deviations above the available time series covering 1961-2011, putting them among the 2.3 percent most severe during the period. 
Empirical Results

The E §ect of Ináationary Crises on Economic Ministries
Are politicians who hail from countries that have su §ered a severe ináation shocks more likely to enlist ináation-Öghting technocrats in government? The Örst series of ordered probit models display the e §ects of the independent variables on the professional training of Latin American 61 I use the executive constraints (xconst) variable from the Polity IV data set. In additional robustness checks, I also employ an alternative measure of executive constraints from Heniszís (2000) Political Constraint Database. 62 The IMF dummy is coded 1 for the country-years when there was a conditioned IMF agreement in force, 0 otherwise. I use two di §erent measures of IMF participation from Vreeland (2002 Vreeland ( , 2003 and Dreher (2006) .
63 Polillo and GuillÈn (2005) update of the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) index. 64 I only include the central bank independence index in additional robustness checks since it assigns numerical values to countries that do not vary over time. The country dummies, which are already included in the model, incorporate the same e §ect.
65 Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Lupu 2014. 66 For example, parties that are deÖned as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing take on a value of 1. Parties deÖned as centrist take on a value of 2. Parties that are deÖned as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing take on a value of 3. Otherwise, the variable is 0. economic ministers. The coe¢cient on past ináation crisis is positive and statistically signiÖcant at the 99 percent conÖdence interval across the regression models (see models 1-5 in Table 1 ).
Employing these coe¢cients to derive the predicted probability of minister professionalization, I
Önd that an ináation crisis history makes a government as much as two-Öfths more likely to have both a Önance minister and central bank president with advanced economic training. These results lend considerable support to the ináation crisis hypothesis (H 1 ). 67 A crisis past appears to catalyze economic ministry professionalization.
Results for control variables also generally correspond to expectations. The coe¢cient for the domestic output gap is negative and statistically signiÖcant, meaning when economic growth is below its trend rate, politicians are less likely to appoint professional economists to provide ináation control. Similarly, unemployment is negatively correlated with technocratic ministers, suggesting that when unemployment is high, politicians are not as likely to appoint advisors with advanced economics training.
For robustness, I expanded the deÖnition of a technocrat to include educational background or previous career experience, techp, given that experience working for the private sector or international institutions can also contribute to technocratic knowledge of Önance, business, or global markets (see appendix for more details). This robustness test did not yield any material changes, however (see model 5 in Table 1 ).
In a series of further robustness checks, the core results remain unchanged when controlling for several political control variables that account for whether a country has a long democratic tenure, considerable constraints on its executive, an IMF program, or a left-leaning government.
The coe¢cient for age of democracy, for example, is positive and statistically signiÖcant. This
Önding is in line with the notion that politicians in established democracies are more likely to be held accountable by their electorates, 68 and hence, may confront greater pressure to appoint skilled technocrats to economic posts. This positive relationship between democracy and technocrats also provides some support to the ídemocratic advantageí literature, which suggests that democratic governments may have yet another incentive to appoint technocrats: 69 improving their access to 67 Endogeneity between technocratic ministers and ináation crises is unlikely to be a major problem because the ministerial shift to technocrats follows the regionís ináation crisis. 68 Brender and Drazen 2005; also see Barberia and Avelino 2011. 69 Flores, Lloyd, and Nooruddin 2014. Önancing. 70 Notably, the small and statistically insigniÖcant coe¢cient on left partisanship suggests that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that partisanship has no e §ect on the share of technocratic advisors serving the government. While a rich political economy literature on partisanship expects that the right will be more likely to appoint technocratic ministers who value ináation control, 71 I
Önd little support for such partisan di §erences in Latin America.
The E §ect of Technocratic Ministers on Budgetary Balances
Does the regionís turn toward technocratic presidential advisors help explain the prevalence of more centrist, macroeconomic policies in the region? The di §usion literature expects that economic policy choices reáect the ideological persuasion of key economic advisors, suggesting that formal training in Western economics leads them to share a similar set of beliefs about the importance of a disciplined approach to economic policymaking. 72 I Önd some support for this pattern, but itís conditional on the regionís crisis history.
The coe¢cient on technocratic ministers, as measured by the Index of Economic Advisors, is statistically insigniÖcant across the majority of the Öscal regression models (see Table 2 , models 1-6). We therefore cannot rule out the null hypothesis that professional training has no e §ect on budgetary policy during non-ináationary periods. Moreover, in the models where the coe¢cient is statistically signiÖcant, it also has a negative sign, suggesting that technocrats may even have the opposite e §ect on governance ñ they may preside over larger Öscal deÖcits than their counterparts without such formal training.
Notably, the coe¢cient on ináation crisis has a positive and statistically signiÖcant relationship with governmentsí Öscal balances. In other words, governments hailing from countries with ináation crises, on average, tend to have budgetary Önances that are as much as 1.7 percentage points of GDP better (i.e. lower budget deÖcits or higher budget surpluses) than governments that have never experienced an ináation crisis.
Ináation crisis legacies appear to be an important contributor of budgetary discipline, but might technocrats help reinforce these crisis memories? Perhaps, the e §ect of formal training 70 Beaulieu, Cox, and Saiegh 2012 71 Carter and Irons 1991; Babb 2001; Montecinos and Marko § 2010. 72 Ibid.
is conditional on a countryís economic conditions, with professional economists more likely to value Öscal discipline and ináation control in countries traumatized by runaway ináation. The conditional models (see Table 2 ) examine the relationship between a countryís crisis history and its economic advisorsí formal training. The regression results show that technocratic ministers have a statistically signiÖcant and strongly ameliorating e §ect on the health of public Önances in ináation-crisis countries, in line with the expectations of the second hypothesis (H 2 ). Figure 1 .4 illustrates the marginal e §ects of these conditional models (also see model 5 in Table   2 ). In countries that have never experienced an ináation crisis, technocrats have a negative and statistically signiÖcant e §ect on budget balances. In other words, they are more likely to widen budget deÖcits to stimulate the economy. By contrast, government balances tend to improve considerably in ináation-scarred countries. This statistically signiÖcant relationship becomes stronger and more precise when professional economists advise governments; technocratic ministers are positively correlated (at the 99 percent conÖdence level) with a strengthening of government budget balances.
In other words, ináation crises tend to promote Öscal rectitude generally, but professionally-trained technocrats are likely to be even more austere than non-technocrats in the countries. In fact, these Öndings suggest that an ináation crisis history, on average, improves government budget balances by about 1.7 percentage points of GDP ñ and technocratic advisors tend to add an additional two-thirds of a percent of GDP to this baseline.
Results for the control variables are also consistent with expectations. In summary, these Öndings provide considerable support for the theoretical framework, which expects that technocratic ministers are most likely to favor control of budget deÖcits as a pathway to ináation control in countries that have experienced ináation crises. Notably, these results remained robust after conducting a series of tests using both the expanded technocratic measure (techp) 74 that includes previous employment (see model 3 in Table 2 ) and the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator (see models 4-6 in 78 Stokes 2001. 79 The Convertibility Plan was crafted by Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo. By an act of Congress, it sought to maintain exchange rate stability, and hence domestic price stability, by pegging the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar. The law guaranteed peso-U.S. dollar parity and barred money supply increases that were not backed by foreign exchange reserves.
ness. Labeling the neoliberal ideas associated with convertibility as "theories of misery," Kirchner often spoke of building a "more just, inclusive, and equitable future" through the "struggle for growth, jobs, and social inclusion." 80 He hoped to increase employment through public spending and industrial promotion.
Facing economic headwinds from the crisis, however, Kirchner had to proceed slowly. In the wake of the 2001-02 debt crisis, Argentines feared that the collapse of its currency board system, which had anchored ináation expectations throughout the 1990s, would unleash a new bout of runaway ináation. Kirchnerís economic team embraced Öscal discipline to keep low and stable ináation. In fact, a key member of that team, Ricardo Delgado, reáected upon President Kirchnerís marching orders, which included a "clear commitment to Öscal health" that was considered part of "the political fortiÖcation." 81 Kirchnerís Öscal discipline helped yield a budget surplus that averaged a healthy 2.6 percent of GDP during his presidential term. Notwithstanding a post-crisis expansion that had already average nearly 9 percent growth over the past Öve years, President Cristina Kirchner continued to spend, refusing to slow the economy to more sustainable growth levels. When ináation began to rear its ugly head, the Kirchner administration preferred to protect Argentines from rising prices with extensive subsidies and wage hikes, even if these measures risked unleashing the runaway ináation that once haunted Argentina in the early 1990s. The members of her economic team even resorted to doctoring the o¢cial ináation statistics so that they could justify maintaining their expansionary policy stance. 87 Counterfactually, it would have been possible for Kirchner to use macroeconomic policy to gradually slow the economy without jeopardizing the expansion. In line with Keynesian economic theory, the presidentís economic team could have used counter-cyclical policy ñ or a withdrawal of America that has su §ered from considerable economic volatility. Throughout the last few decades, ináation crises have propelled many Latin American governments toward greater economic discipline. However, the Argentine case underscores that this is not a permanent transformation, and vulnerabilities to new shocks that are deáationary (i.e. a renewed global credit crunch) rather than ináationary could tip the scales in the other direction.
Conclusion
The e §ect of past ináationary crises on Latin American policymaking communities is impres- severe ináation crises tend to professionalize presidential economic teams, who then often govern with an anti-ináation bias. I Önd that governments in ináation-scarred countries generally have more Öscal discipline than their non-crisis counterparts, but the presence of technocratic ministers leads to even more austere budgetary policies.
Traumatic economic shocks tend to cast a long-shadow of economic policymaking, where politicians and their technocratic advisors govern more cautiously in hopes of avoiding a repeat of past crises. Alan GarcÌa, who returned to the Peruvian presidency sixteen years after a 1990 ináation-spurred ouster, perhaps best illustrates this trend of political risk aversion. After governing through a hyperináation episode that eroded wages and deepened poverty, GarcÌa adopted a sound economic policy framework that included Öscal discipline and ináation-targeting during his second presiden- The drawback of such risk aversion is that politicians may tie their own hands by appointing technocrats that limit their room for policy maneuverability. In the case of Argentina, the technocratic response to hyperináation ñ a rigid commitment to convertibility ñ was so disproportionate and costly that it eventually sowed the seeds for the exact opposite crisis: a deáation spiral.
Governing through the lens of history also heightens the risk of extreme policy reversals in more volatile economies. For example, during its deáationary spiral in the 2000s, Argentine policymakers reversed their economic policies to reáect the saliency of the latest crisis. As deáationary fears replaced ináation anxiety, political costs were increasingly calculated in job losses rather than in purchasing power losses. For Argentines, austerity may have once reduced the risk of rekindling runaway ináation, but highly interventionist policies now held the promise of boosting the countryís moribund employment. 96 In a recent interview with Roberto Lavagna, the Argentine economy minister who navigated the country beyond the 2001-02 economic crisis, Lavagna emphasized the tendency for economic volatility to beget costly policy reversals.
"The pendulum moves from one extreme to the other ñ this is the history of Argentina over the last 30 to 40 years...here, the people have a way of reacting a lot more strongly to economic problems than in other countries...any populist can push toward an extreme, and when you are at an extreme point an economic crisis arrives; and when an economic crisis arrives, the solution comes from orthodoxy and then everything changes back; when orthodoxy changes everything and fails ñ and inevitably it will also fail ñ it
[populism] returns again." 97
Over the last few decades in Latin America, such extreme macroeconomic policy reversals have been limited beyond the Argentina context. Past ináation trauma has ushered in era of macroeconomic discipline throughout much of the region. These policies have provided the region with much need economic stability, but ongoing risk-aversion has left the region unable to adapt to the most pressing new challenges.
Facing demands from a growing middle class to be socially more responsive, however, some 
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We are already seeing such policy reversals elsewhere in the world. After Öve years of austerity, lackluster growth, and high unemployment in much of the euro area, the merits of austerity are being openly contested and accompanied by resounding electoral calls for policies that encourage growth, jobs, and competitiveness. Such changes to Europeís economic model could help fuel the recovery, but Latin Americaís recent crisis history o §ers Europe a cautionary tale about the importance of post-crisis policy moderation. Average ináation is converted to its natural logarithm.
A.1 Macroeconomic Model Discussion
The literature on the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking provides a theoretical structure for economic policy choices. In these models, government preferences are captured through loss functions. The Barro-Gordon loss-function is one of the most commonly employed theoretical models. It shows politiciansí relative sensitivity to unemployment and ináation. Their utility varies directly with employment (or growth), yet indirectly with ináation. 98
where U t = employment rate; U t n = natural rate of unemployment; -t = ináation rate; a = relative weight of unemployment in the loss function ( a > 0); b = relative weight of ináation term 98 The functional form of these loss functions varies across the literature, but their main intuition is that policymakers and voters dislike ináation and unemployment, but support economic growth. For a more detailed description of loss functions and macroeconomic policymaking, see Barro and Gordon (1983) and Scheve (2004). in loss function ( b > 0); k = extent of distortions (e.g. unemployment compensation and income taxation) that make U t n exceed the e¢cient or socially optimal rate ( 0 < k < 1).
This loss function shows how policymakers value full employment and price stability. More speciÖcally, the ratio of its parameters a and b captures the beneÖt of employment (and growth) relative to the cost of higher ináation. In other words, these parameters indicate policymakersí level of ináation aversion. A government favoring a Keynesian view is likely to assign a low weight to ináation relative to unemployment in its loss function. By contrast, a government favoring a monetarist approach is more likely to assign a higher weight to ináation relative to unemployment in their loss functions.
Building from the intuition of these models, I expect that countriesí crisis histories will ináuence domestic politiciansí sensitivity to ináation and unemployment.
A.2 Coding Rules for the Index of Economic Advisors
In order to test whether the regionís hyperináationary shocks led to the professionalization of 99 The complete dataset is available upon request. 100 While most countries have only one ministry assigned to Öscal policy, some have a variety of ministries involved in economic and Önancial planning, making it di¢cult to discern whether the government institution of interest should be the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, or the Ministry of Economic Development, among others. For more information regarding the selection of ministry, including a table listing each Ministry per country, please refer to the end of this document.
Additionally, on some occasions (e.g. Argentina 2001/2002) there were more than 1 ministers of Önance in a given year. The higher turnover often occurred at instances of Önancial crises, and consequently, the individual who held the seat for the longest amount of time during any given year was selected. For robustness, we expanded the deÖnition of a technocrat to include previous career experience.
We assume that o¢cials hailing from the private sector or international Önancial institutions were appointed to their posts in light of their applied experience in business, Önance, or global markets. In the case of the Central American countries, the decision of which ministry to use was based on the ministry participating in COSEFIN ñ the permanent forum for ministries of Önance in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic. The ministries/secretariats used for each country can be found in the table below:
